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Autocratic regimes are quite often short-lived kleptocracies formed and 
maintained through force and used to appropriate wealth from subjects.  Some of 
these autocracies collapse after only a year or two of plundering while others 
manage to survive for fifteen or twenty years.  This paper asks why some 
autocratic regimes survive while others fail.  A database of political regimes from 
1960 to 2003 is introduced and accompanies the paper in an appendix.  A model 
of political survival suggests that autocrats exchange constraints on their 
executive power for their continued survival.  The relationship between payouts 
from successful rebellion and ease of rebellion determines how willing kleptocrats 
are to extend the political franchise and protect their power.  Results show that 
extremely oppressive regimes and great expenditures on security are likely to 
accompany the most difficult environments for defense of the state.  The model is 
used to identify the costs of pervasive political conflict and to decompose the 
“civil peace dividend” enjoyed by inclusive democracies that do not suffer from 
the malady of kleptocratic rule.  Finally, the model suggests that slow 
democratization pushed by the autocratic elites themselves to guarantee their 
survival, accompanied by stable development, may be the best path toward a 
democratic future for many fragile states. 
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The kleptocratic tendencies of autocratic regimes has been argued in Grossman and Noh (1994), 
Konrad and Skaperdas (1999), Addison and Murshed (2002), Mehlum, Moene and Torvik 
(2002), Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow (2003) and Acemoglu, Robinson and 
Verdier (2004).  These papers suggest that the governing elites in these regimes reward their 
base, client and patron networks (often organized along ethnolinguistic, religious or ideological 
party lines) with appropriation from those not in these networks, the subject population.  Often 
this appropriation takes the form of taxation, though it can also include direct appropriation by 
force and rents from special licenses; sale of rights; privatization and plundering of natural and 
national resources; impunities from crime; and the privileged use of the powers of the state, 
including military and police services.  Since kleptocratic elites prefer to stay in power to extract 
these rents, the research question is how do they avoid costly and unproductive political 
competition to maintain power? 
  In the model that follows, two players – “the governing elites” and “the subject 
population” – balance the costs and rewards of civil conflict against the shared benefits of civil 
cooperation.  The model is specifically designed to highlight the trade-off that all actors in any 
civil society face between contributing to total output of the state (“creating a larger pie” through 
cooperation) and exerting energy to increase their share of output (“securing a larger piece of the 
pie” through conflict).  Unlike previous models it distinguishes between the costs of conflict 
borne in the form of conflict resources and the costs of conflict due to lost cooperation.  This 
approach captures both the effect of asymmetry on civil conflict and the incentives for all actors 
for civil cooperation.  In the model the governing elites use this authority to declare a tax rate: a 
simple division of the total output if both parties cooperate, similar to a single-round offer game.  
It is this advantage, the setting of the tax rate, which separates the two groups and ensures that all 
gains from cooperation are enjoyed by the elites.  Given this tax rate, both players assign effort 
to conflict.  For the governing elites this effort is security or repression: the force of the state 
employed to maintain and protect the status quo, effectively enforcing the tax rate.  For the 
subjects, this effort represents everything from organizing to civil disobedience to rebellion: any 
efforts taken to overthrow the governing elites and secure the resources of the state for 
themselves.  This simple model provides rich results on the distribution of income, the behavior 
of both groups and the costs of conflict.   3
In the first section of the paper some descriptive statistics on regime change are presented 
to motivate the research questions.  In the second section of the paper, a simple model of an 
“autocracy game” is developed within the context of similar models in the previous literature.  
The model shows how autocratic elites are able to extend the political franchise to prolong the 
life of an otherwise unpopular regime.  This approach contributes to the literature by 
differentiating between the costs of the conflict through conflict expenditure and the costs of 
conflict associated with missed opportunities for cooperation.  The sum of both of these costs is 
referred to as the “civil peace dividend.”  Additionally, the model allows for continuous levels of 
autocracy – from the most repressive, autocratic regimes to those regimes that are nearly 
democracies – in contrast to previous discrete models in the literature.  A brief comparison in the 
form of a “democracy game” is introduced.  The final section presents some brief empirical 
results which motivate future research questions and concludes.     
 
1.  Some Descriptive Statistics 
Democracy is on the march.   According to the Polity IV data set (Marshall and Jaggers, 2003), 
the number of democracies in the world has increased from 20 in 1945 to more than 80 in 2003
2.  
Though many of these new democracies are new states, a similar trend is not seen in autocracies, 
which saw a rise from approximately 50 in 1945 to more than 100 in the late 1970s and then 
declined to less than 80 autocracies in 2003.  Many of these autocracies became functioning 
democracies in the last quarter of the 20
th century during the so-called “Third Wave” of 
democratization (Huntington, 1991).   
Huntington suggests that industrialization and economic development lead to a 
burgeoning middle class that ultimately demands democratic representation.  Though there has 
been an overall trend in democratization in the world accompanied by economic development, 
the general trend that constitutes Huntington’s Third Wave does not capture the autocratic fits 
and democratic starts that many of these countries have experienced during their political 
journey.  How did Botswana transition so smoothly out of British rule and how has Honduras 
                                                 
2 The list of countries and regimes included in the study is available as an appendix to the paper.  Autocratic regimes 
are defined as any regime with a Polity score of less than 3 in its first year.  Statistics for regime start date and the 
length of survival of a regime were compiled with reference to Krieger (2001) and clarification from CIA (2005) 
and Geddes (1999), as necessary.  Polity is the democracy score less the autocracy scores from the Polity IV data 
set.  Both of the component measures range from 0 to 10, therefore polity scores are range from -10 (Absolute 
autocracy, no democracy) to 10 (Democracy, no autocracy).  For more information, see Marshall and Jaggers 
(2003).   4
managed to keep the military out of politics for the past two decades?  Should Sri Lanka and 
Venezuela be considered successful democratic transitions?  Why did democratic experiments in 
the Sudan, Somalia and the Gambia fail?  As Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared (2004) 
suggest, the answers to these questions lie not in cross-country comparisons on broad trends in 
income and education.  This paper goes one step farther than Acemoglu, et al., suggesting that 
the answer lies in the incentives of the principal players. 
To highlight the difference between the global trend of democratization and the nature of 
specific political transitions, I run some exploratory regressions and report the results in Figure 1.  
A simple fixed-effects regression of polity score on lagged level of economic development (GDP 
per capita, PPP) on a sample of 151 countries supports Huntington’s Third Wave hypothesis with 
a significant positive coefficient of 1.69 (the first point estimate with line confidence interval of 
95% in Figure 1, measured on the right axis).  Not only is the effect of lagged GDP on polity 
score positive, but there is some impressive explanatory power between countries (R
2=.35, first 
vertical bar in Figure 1, measured on the left axis).  This accounts for the intuitive appeal of the 
Third Wave hypothesis: it is generally the case that more developed countries have more 
participatory political systems.   
However, this relationship between development and polity score breaks down when the 
sample is selected by polity score.  The rest of Figure 1 shows the effect of restricting the sample 
based on polity score two years prior to the observation.  For example, the results in the second 
bar are restricted to preceding polity scores equal to or less than 9.  The sample farthest to the 
right of Figure 1 is for only those countries with observations of polity score of -9 or -10.   The 
vertical lines illustrate confidence intervals around the point estimates of the coefficients.  The 
mid-range samples illustrate how tenuous the Third Wave hypothesis is.  When the sample is 
restricted to polity scores of less than 6, the coefficient of income on polity score actually 
becomes negative and significant.  These results would suggest that countries with lower 
incomes are likely to be more democratic, perfectly contrary to Huntington.  As the samples are 
restricted even farther, the coefficient becomes positive and significant again when only the most 
authoritarian countries are considered (the far right section of the figure).   Additionally, note 
how the explanatory power (R
2) drops off dramatically when those countries with polity scores 































































Figure 1: Effect of Development on Democracy, Allowing Sample to Vary by Polity Score
 
Figure 1 depicts both the general trend that more developed countries are more 
democratic and the nuanced reality that economic development alone cannot account for either 
the successes or the failures of recent democratic transitions.  Of course, these results do not 
speak to causality at all, simply the relationship between development and democracy.  What can 
be concluded from Figure 1 and the statistics so far is that countries that are able to build lasting 
democracies and enjoy some prosperity seem to pool at a stable equilibrium among other 
successful performers including the OECD countries and a few eastern European transition 
economies as suggested by Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi (2000).  This equilibrium 
is little consolation to the people of the 80-plus anocracies and autocracies identified earlier that 
might yet want to make this transition and reach the seemingly stable and prosperous democratic 
equilibrium enjoyed by the first world.  Since there seems to be little compelling evidence that 
there are specific country effects that determines success in political transitions, I follow 
Przeworski, et al. (2000) and turn to comparison of regimes across countries and time to explain 
why some countries fail and other succeed at establishing functioning democracies.   
Of 118 developing countries listed in the accompanying appendix, 188 autocratic regimes 
failed during the period 1960 to 2003.  Seven regimes survived the entire 44 years (Bhutan, 
China, Cuba, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Saudi Arabia) and approximately 30 lasted more than 
20 years.  The mean age at failure was a little over 10 years.  Note that these statistics speak 
more to the fragility of the state in general in developing countries than autocracies in particular, 
since among democracies that failed during the same period, the mean age was about 9 years.    6
What is telling is not the frequency with which regimes fail in these fragile states, but the 
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Figure 2: Autocratic Regime Failures by Following Regime Type 
 
Figure 2 divides the 188 autocratic regime failures by the type of regime that followed.  
An autocratic regime that failed in less than 10 years was much more likely to become another 
autocracy than a democracy.  By comparison, an autocratic regime that failed after more than 10 
years was only slightly more likely to be followed by an autocracy than a democracy.  Regimes 
that are replaced with other autocratic regimes last on average 10.3 years with a median survival 
of only 6 years, whereas autocratic regimes that are replaced by democratic regimes last on 
average 13.4 years with a median survival of 10 years.  Is there something systematic about the 
approaches of rulers in longer-lived autocracies that simultaneously increase their political 
longevity and also result in more democratic transitions? 
  A surrender of authority by the governing elites could explain the disparities in survival 
and regime change in autocratic regimes.  Polity data from the Polity IV data set is used as a 
measure of political restraint – an increase in polity score in a given year is considered increased 
constraint on political authority.  Table 1 shows that autocratic regimes that are followed by 
democracies are also much more likely to extend the franchise sometime during their reign.  
Column 1 tabulates the count and percentages of increases in polity score for those autocratic 
regimes that are succeeded by democracies.  Column 2 counts the increases in polity score for 
those autocratic regimes that are followed by other autocracies.  Column 3 counts the increases   7
in polity score for those regimes that do not fail over the observation period (those that “survive” 
through the end of 2003). 
Table 1.   Autocratic Regimes, Type of Transition and Increases in Polity Score 
 
Column 1 
Autocratic Regimes that 
Transition to Limited 
Democracies 
Column 2 




Autocratic Regimes that 
Survive through the 
End of the Sample 
Total Observations  65  116  66 
 N  %  N  %  N  %  
0  Increases  in  Polity  41 63 93 80 25 38 
1  Increase  in  Polity  13 20 14 12 19 29 
2  Increases  in  Polity  4 6 8 7  11  7 
3  Increases  in  Polity  5 7 1 1 7  10 
4  Increases  in  Polity  1 2 0 0 4 6 
5  Increases  in  Polity  1 2 0 0 0 0 
        
Mean Age  13.4  10.3  20.8 
Median  Age  10 6 14 
     
Sources:   Regime Dates: Compiled by the Author, see accompanying appendix. 
  Increase in Polity Score: Polity IV 
  An autocracy is defined as a regime that started with a polity score of 2 or less. 
A democratic regime is one that comes to power with a polity score of 3 or more. 
 
  Thirty-seven percent of the autocracies that transition into limited democracies increase 
polity at least once during their lifetime, whereas only 20% of the regimes that transition to 
autocratic regimes increase their polity score.  For those autocratic regimes that outlive the 
sample period (column 3), 62% increase polity score at least once.    
  The data is compelling and motivates the present analysis; however, it is hardly 
conclusive.  In addition to providing the backdrop for the discussion that follows, Table 1 also 
introduces the endogeneity issues that plague the discussion of democracy and development.  It 
could be that extension of the political franchise reduces political competition and decreases the 
likelihood of regime ending power struggles; or it could simply be that short-lived autocratic 
regimes don’t live long enough to extend the franchise, and thus fewer extensions are observed.  
Similarly, the transitions in Figure 2 could be a manifestation of increasing trends toward 
democratization (the Third Wave) – if such a trend exists then longer-lived regimes are more 
likely to fail later in the sample period and are more likely to be replaced by democratic regimes.  
The direction of causality cannot be inferred from this simple correlation.  The model that 
follows in the next section shows how new constraints on executive authority in the form of an 
extension of the franchise could result in increased survival of an autocratic regime.    8
 
2. A Model of Political Survival for Kleptocrats 
The model follows Acemoglu and Robinson’s seminal “Theory of Political Transitions” 
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 1999) and a similar model of political competition presented by 
Addison and Murshed (2005).   It is also informed by the insights from Grossman and Noh 
(1994), the first paper in the literature to endogenize political survival.  This model is slightly 
more general than Acemoglu and Robinson (1999) in that there are no assumptions on inequality 
or distribution of wealth – the governing elites and the subjects are defined only by the strategy 
set available to them.  One difference between this model and its predecessors is that it includes 
both a measure of gains from cooperation and costs of conflict in resources devoted to 
competition.  This allows for an accurate assessment of the civil peace dividend.  The model 
presented here also allows for continuous measures of democracy, conflict and economic 
performance, while the predecessor models only allow for discrete states of democracy/non-
democracy, rebellion/no rebellion and high/low economic performance.  Continuous measures of 
these variables allow for the very real possibility that the elites in power in an autocracy can 
surrender some of their political authority to avoid or lessen civil conflict ensuring the survival 
of their regime.  Such kleptocratic survival instincts are a very real possibility previously ignored 
in the discrete models. 
 
2.1 The Basic Model 
The model assumes two groups, the governing elites and the subject population.  The governing 
elites (denoted by subscript G) control the government and claim a monopoly on the use of 
violence to protect that control.  The subjects (denoted by subscript S) are simply the outsiders of 
the state functions – their only available strategy is resisting the state in the hopes of regime 
change.   These two groups each act collectively as two players, assuming away collective action 
problems in the following simple game: 
1. At the beginning of the game the state of the economy is revealed to both 
players
3.  This information includes the composition of elites and subjects, 
                                                 
3 The basic game is abstracted from issues of time.  Obviously the shadow of the future weighs heavily over both 
actors as they determine whether they will engage in civil conflict where one side might be eliminated.  However, 
for simplicity, expectations on future output and shares are included in present value state of the economy realized in 
stage 1.      9
information on total output, Y and the payouts for both players, γY  and  λY, 
respectively, given a successful rebellion that period. 
2.  In response to the state of the economy, the governing elites set the level of 
autocracy, A, which determines the tax rate, τ, as described below. 
3. In response to A and τ and in light of the state of the economy the elites and 
subjects simultaneously devote resources to fighting, F, which determines the 
probability of regime change. 
4.  Payoffs are realized for each group dependent upon the outcome of the regime 
change contest (regime change or otherwise). 
The one thing that both groups know at the beginning of the game is what the total output of the 
state will be and what their shares would be, given a successful rebellion.  In other words, both 
players know the size of the pie and how the pie would be divided if the elites were to be 
removed from power.  In this event the governing elites receive γY, the subjects receive λY and 
some fraction, θ, of the total expected output is lost because of the lack of cooperation, such that: 
γ + λ + θ  =   1           ( 1 )  
The values of these parameters determine what “type” of economy is being represented.  A very 
low  γ, high λ  and low θ might represent a “tinpot dictator” or a small group of privileged 
governing elites who are extracting rents simply by virtue of controlling the military and the 
government (Wintrobe, 1998).  Conversely, a high γ and low θ suggests that the elites contribute 
quite a bit to the output and have little to lose from civil conflict.  In addition to the relative 
values of γ and λ, the value of θ is very telling on the economy type.  A low value of θ implies 
that there is little complementarity between the output of both groups and small expected gains 
from civil cooperation.  A high value of θ suggests that there is great complementarity and 
cooperation could be very beneficial to both groups.    
If both groups cooperate and abide by the policies established by the governing elites, 
total output for the economy is Y.  However, before either group decides how much to devote to 
security/conflict, the governing elites propose a taxation/redistribution/appropriation policy, τ.  
Under this scheme, if both groups cooperate, the governing elites receive τY and the subjects 
receive (1-τ)Y.  These terms are defined in the most general economic sense and taxation can 
take any form of allocation or appropriation of the output – from income and other taxation to 
bribes and corruption that add costs to transactions.      10
Whatever the form of the taxation, the governing elites would certainly like to tax as 
much as possible from the subjects.  They face two constraints on their choice of taxation level.  
First, if they set a very high tax level, the subject population will revolt and overthrow the 
regime.  Second, they are constrained by their own credibility.  Since the elites claim a monopoly 
on the use of force, there is nothing to stop them from declaring a tax rate and then reneging on 
the tax rate after both groups have agreed to cooperate, effectively extracting rents from their 
monopoly on force.   
To mitigate these constraints, the elites can willingly surrender some portion of their 
executive authority, yielding some portion of their political power to the subject population – 
effectively allowing them some say in τ.  Note that there is no group mobility, relinquishing 
political power does not affect the identities of the two groups.  Though the subjects participate 
more in the political process determining τ through an extension of the franchise, their share of 
the output if they cooperate will still be (1- τ).  The relationship between taxation and autocracy 
is assumed to be basically monotonic, τ=f(A), f’>0.   
This implies that the level of autocracy determines the de facto level of taxation; since the 
governing elites will tax all that they can, given the constraints on their executive power.  Thus 
the model is cognizant of the reality well-known by the disenfranchised of the world: totalitarian 
talk is cheap.  The elites can declare whatever tax rate they like, but the subjects know what the 
actual tax rate will be given the constraints on executive power.  The model that follows is first 
solved for the optimal level of taxation, τ*.   
If both groups cooperate under the tax rate determined by the political process described 
above, the income of each group is given by YG and YR as follows: 
YG= τY  and  YS=(1- τ)Y where  τ=f(A),   γ+θ ≤ τ <1  and f’>0   (2a,2b) 
This cooperation is what the governing elites would like to have happen, but the subjects don’t 
have to accept this tax rate as a given.  The subject population has some capacity to rebel and 
overthrow the governing elites through civil conflict, here broadly defined to include anything 
from civil disobedience, protests and strikes to bloody rebellions – any type of civil conflict 
intended to result in regime change.  Resources devoted to this conflict by the governing elites 
and the subject population are referred to here as “fighting” and are represented by the variables 
FG and FS, respectively.  As long as τ > γ+θ, it is assumed that some civil conflict occurs 
whenever resources are expended on fighting – whether it is posturing, protesting, riots or actual   11
civil war
4.  The outcome of the conflict is determined by a simple weighted contest success 
function, following Hirshleifer (1995) and Skaperdas (1996).  The probability of the subjects’ 









=   μ> 0         ( 3 )  
The parameter μ weights the function for or against the subject population.  For μ>1 the subjects 
have an advantage in the contest; for the cost of one unit of fighting resources for the governing 
elites, the subjects receive effectively μ units toward the contest.  This advantage could represent 
mountainous and wooded terrain benefits to guerrilla warfare as suggested by Sambanis (2004) 
and Collier and Hoeffler (2004); the ease of targeting certain strategic interests such as oil 
pipelines and alluvial diamonds as discussed in Ross (2004); and the relative ease of gathering, 
organization and refuge provided by large, homogenous ethnic and linguistic groups among the 
rebels (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004).  Conversely, a μ<1 suggests an advantage for the governing 
elites in the civil conflict, which could represent relatively easily navigable terrain; highly 
developed communications and infrastructure that compliment security efforts by the 
government (Fearon, 2005); and/or highly fractionalized ethnic groups among the subjects, 
making it easier for the governing elites to “divide and conquer” in any civil conflict.   
  With these assumptions, the expected income of risk-neutral governing elites can be 
found by weighting the implicit payoffs from equations 1 and 2a by the probability of a 
successful regime change given by equation 3 to form equation 4a: 
  E(YG)=(1-π)(τY-FG) + π (γY-FG)        ( 4 a )  
  With probability (1-π) the power struggle is unsuccessful and the governing elites 
maintain their hold on the government, collecting their share of the total output, τY, and paying 
for their security, FG.  With probability π the power struggle is successful and the governing 
elites are left with their consolation income of γY, though they must still pay for their security, 
FG. 
                                                 
4 Skaperdas (1996), Konrad and Skaperdas (1999) and others point out that conflict itself is costly and that once 
resources have been spent on establishing a credible position of strength, both sides can benefit from negotiating as 
an alternative to violence.   While this is invariably true, explicitly modeling negotiations would add another level of 
complexity to the game by introducing another node to the stage game without changing the first-order effects 
appreciably.  Additionally, there are some limits on assumptions regarding negotiations in the presence of violence 
that make negotiated settlements less credible.  Instead, the present definition of conflict is more broadly conceived 
to include negotiations, protests, rallies and other nonviolent, nonproductive activities that might influence the 
outcome of the contest.   12
  Similarly, the expected income of risk-neutral subjects is given by equation 4b: 
  E(YS)=(1-π)((1-τ)Y-FS) + π (λY-FS)           ( 4 b )  
  Like equation 4a, the payoffs and costs for the subjects in the event that the regime 
maintains power or that the power struggle is successful, (1-τ)Y-FS or λY-FS, respectively, are 
weighted by the probability of success in regime change, π.  This equation confirms the lower 
limit on τ: for there to be any civil conflict in this environment, the tax rate, τ, must be set above 
γ + θ, otherwise the subjects have no incentive to overthrow the regime.  In this light, the gains 
from cooperation in an autocracy are the “rents” of power, enjoyed by the governing elites.  
When the level of autocracy is sufficiently low (as regimes become more democratic), the tax 
rate approaches this bound.  Once the tax rate passes this boundary, the political dynamics of the 
regime are different (as will be seen below) since the gains from cooperation are being divided 
by both groups, instead of extracted by the elites.  Perhaps this is what fundamentally separates 
kleptocratic autocracies from democratic states. 
  
2.2 Solutions to the Model 
Armed with this very simple model, equilibria follow.  To begin, note that equation 4b shows 
how the payoff to the subject population is contingent upon the policy choice of the elites.  As 
the elites increase taxation, τ, the incentives for cooperation decrease for the subjects and the 
marginal returns to conflict increases through π, while the unit cost of conflict is constant.  Taken 
together, equations 4a and 4b illustrate the fundamental aspect of all non-productive activities; 
since conflict is costly, there are Pareto preferred allocations involving less competition that 
would be preferred by both parties were they credible.  This can be shown by reducing 
equilibrium FR and FG by the same factor – the probability of success in the civil conflict does 
not change and expected income increases for both actors.  This illustrates how it can be in the 
elites’ interests to surrender political authority, if such a move reduces resources spent on costly 
political competition by both parties
5. 
  Recall that the sequencing in the game is such that the governing elites set a policy choice 
for the levels of autocracy, A, and then both parties respond with resources devoted to conflict, 
                                                 
5 Gehlbach (2005) argues that autocratic elites cannot credibly commit to lower levels of appropriation and cites the 
Glorious Revolution as an example: the Crown could have benefited from lower taxes through both increased 
productivity and lower political competition, but had to be deposed by Parliament and subjected to restrictions of 
power before both sides would reduce resources devoted to political competition.   13
FS and FG, which determine whether the regime will be overthrown.  Therefore, it is assumed 
that the elites set their optimal choice of autocracy, A*, and the de facto tax rate, τ* using 
backwards induction from optimal levels of fighting resources, FG
NE  and F S
NE.  Taking 
derivatives of equations 4a and 4b with respect to FG and FS, respectively, solving for each and 
substituting in these solutions yields the following unique Nash Equilibria, FG
NE and FS
NE: 
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=        (5a) 
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− − + −
− − −
=        (5b) 
  Recall from equation 4b that an interior solution that involves civil conflict occurs when τ 
> γ + θ.   From the best response functions derived from 4a and 4b, it can be shown that FS
 = 0 
and, therefore, π = 0 if τ ≤ γ + θ, so that there is a corner solution without any conflict for a 
sufficiently low tax rate/level of autocracy.  Again, this suggests a fundamental shift in the power 
dynamics between the two groups if the level of autocracy and taxation is low enough (once τ ≤ γ 
+ θ).  This possibility is elaborated upon again later in discussion of stable political equilibria. 
Dividing equation 5a by 5b yields  ( )




.  For the internal conditions specified 
above (τ > γ + θ), resources devoted to conflict by the governing elites is always greater than 
resources devoted to conflict by the subjects.  It will be shown that this is an important feature of 
the model in determining the equilibrium level of taxation/autocracy.   
The two common elements of equations 5a and 5b, (τ-γ) and (τ-γ-θ), describe the 
incentives of both parties for conflict.  The first captures the governing elites’ incentive for 
conflict since it is the difference between their share of output under cooperation/taxation and 
their consolation income given a regime change.  Ceteris paribus, a larger (τ-γ) encourages the 
elites to fight for the right to tax.  The second term, (τ-γ-θ), describes the difference between the 
subjects’ expected income from conflict and their income under the elites’ tax plan.  The 
equilibrium level of resources devoted to conflict by both parties is a function of both of these 
terms, since the best response functions for both parties involve the expected resources devoted 
to fighting by the other.   
Equations 5a and 5b, determine the Nash equilibrium level of conflict, π
NE, when 
substituted into equation 3 to derive equation 6:   14
()
() ( ) θ γ τ μ γ τ
θ γ τ μ
π
− − + −
− −
=
NE        (6) 
Equation 6 solves for some equilibrium probability of success in a political competition, for any 
level of τ (with the possibility that π = 0 if τ ≤ γ + θ, the corner solution suggested earlier for 
sufficiently low levels of taxation).  Since π
NE and the costs associated with conflict, FG
NE and 
FR
NE, are all increasing in τ, it is conceivable that the governing elites may actually prefer a low 
τ.  However, recall that the elites cannot credibly commit to a low level of taxation.  To avoid 
costly political competition, they can commit to a de facto tax rate through an increase in 
democracy.  Taking the derivative of the expected income of the governing elites, equation 4a, 
with respect to τ, substituting in the Nash equilibrium solutions above and solving for a 


















γ τ        (7) 
  The fundamental lesson in equation 7 is that the tax rate/level of autocracy is increasing 
in μ.  This might seem counterintuitive: one might expect elites that face particularly daunting 
opposition to appease their subjects through lower taxation and more representative government.  
However, this result stems from the Cournot nature of the model - because the elites set the tax 
rate before both sides assign resources to conflict they are first movers and their level of security 
is already incorporated in the solution.  Furthermore, since the elites are already expending high 
levels of resources (always shown in equations 5a and 5b), the level of autocracy secures as large 
a share of output as possible, inclusive of the marginal costs of conflict.  Given the asymmetric 
relationship between the two actors, this result is actually quite realistic.   
The result in equation 7 is interesting both for what it contains and what it omits.  As 
expected,  τ* is increasing in γ; ceteris paribus, the reservation income to the elites given a 
rebellion is positively related to their level of taxation.  However, since the share variables, γ, λ 
and θ sum to 1, this relationship is more complex than the partial derivative. Note that τ* is 
increasing in θ, the output due to cooperation, further reinforcing the perspective that gains from 
cooperation should simply be defined as rents from governing in autocratic states.  In fact, the 
derivative with respect to θ is larger than that with respect to γ, implying that a decrease in elite’s 
share offset by an equivalent increase in cooperation share results in more autocracy.  The   15
constraint on shares from equation 1 provides a more nuanced relationship between the shares on 
the level of autocracy. 
The variable conspicuous in its absence from equation 7 is Y, total output.  Equation 7 
suggests that the actual tax rate and, therefore, level of autocracy is not related to level of income 
– seemingly rejecting Huntington’s hypothesis on development and democracy.  This suggests 
that two countries identical in distributions of wealth and cooperation will have the same level of 
autocracy and conflict, regardless of level of income.  This seems like an an outrageous claim, 
but is it?  These results are much more realistic when a distinction is made between income and 
level of development.  While Y reflects the income of the state, the variable μ is actually much 
more closely associated with level of development.   
For example, Fearon (2005) suggests that development in transportation infrastructure 
and communications make guerrilla warfare and other rebel tactics less feasible, and allow for 
better identification of rebels and quicker responses to conflict than in states where these 
networks do not exist.  A positive externality of development could be in decreasing μ.  
However, the relationship between level of income and development is a complex one.  States 
heavily dependent on natural resources, such as those identified in Ross (2004), might have 
higher incomes than comparable states without large stocks of natural resources, yet remain 
exposed to conflict due to the vulnerability of oil pipelines or ease of appropriation of alluvial 
diamonds, for example.    To further muddy the waters, other variables, such as mountainous and 
wooded terrain used by guerrillas and dissidents for cover, and ethnic fractionalization which 
might make organizing and executing revolutionary movements more difficult, might have little 
or nothing to do with level of development, yet affect μ.  Additionally, even in this relatively 
simple model, μ does not affect τ* linearly
6.  The model confirms the evidence presented in 
section 1 and Figure 1.  The relationship between democratization and economic development is 
much more complex than can be captured by a simple regression with income on the right hand 
side.   
To further complicate matters, it seems that income and inequality don’t affect the 
probability of a successful civil conflict under the optimal tax rate.  This can be seen by 
                                                 
















∞ → Lim    16
substituting the solution for τ* back into equation 6 and simplifying for the probability of success 
given the optimal tax rate: 







π           (8) 
Clearly, π* in equation 8 is not a function of Y, γ, λ or θ.  Once equilibrium levels of taxation and 
conflict resources are chosen, the probability of regime change is merely a function of the 
relative strengths of both groups in conflict.  As suggested above μ might include: development, 
ethnic fractionalization and polarization, inequality, terrain, infrastructure, education, natural 
resource dependence and much more.  What exactly is included in μ and what is not?   The 
indiscriminate nature of the variable may explain why so few conclusive results have been 
identified in the conflict literature
7.   While inequality, ethnic fractionalization, terrain and 
natural resource dependence have been found to be significant in one or more studies, they are 
not consistently significant across all (or even most) studies.  About the only variable that is 
significant across all studies in predicting the probability of successful civil conflict is income 
per capita.  As this model and the preliminary data in the first section suggest, however, it is 
likely that researchers have been detecting the impact of higher levels of development on 
reducing the incidence of conflict, not the effects of wealth and income.     
  Finally, the resources devoted to conflict in equilibrium can be determined by 
substituting solutions from equation 7 back into equations 5a and 5b to obtain FG
* and FS
*  in 

























         (9b) 
The optimal levels of resources devoted to fighting, FG
* and FS
*, are shares of Y, increasing in θ 
and non-monotonic in μ, initially increasing and then decreasing.  Equations 9a and 9b 
demonstrate that the ratio of resources devoted to security by the governing elites to that of the 




 which is decreasing in μ but always greater than 1(1.5), suggesting that no 
                                                 
7 See Sambanis (2004) for a very thorough survey of recent articles and a broad array of econometric results that 
illustrate how inconsistent results are across these articles.     17
matter how extremely the contest is weighted toward the subjects, the elites will spend relatively 
more resources to defend their privilege. 
 
2.3 Decomposing the Civil Peace Dividend 
  Before considering the implications of this model the costs of conflict are considered.  
Equations 3, 4a and 4b can be used to determine the net expected output, E(Y*), given 
equilibrium resources devoted to conflict, FG
* and FS
*, and optimal tax rate, τ*: 
  E(Y*| τ*, λ, γ, θ) = E(YG)+ E(YS) = Y - FG
* - FS
* - π
*θY      (12) 
  Expected output is composed of four elements, total output, expenditures on conflict by 
each group and the lost output from cooperation in the event of successful conflict.  To motivate 
this argument, Table 2 compares three possible ex post interpretations of output, Ψ,  given 
observed cooperation and civil peace, P, or civil conflict and rebellion, R. 
Table 2:  Three Interpretations of GDP 
  Observation under Peace  Observation under Rebellion 
1) “Naïve” Measure  Ψ
P
1 = Y  Ψ
R
1 = Y 
 - θY 
2) “Empirical” Measure  Ψ
P
2 = Y – FS
*    Ψ
R
2 = Y – FS
* - θY 
3) “Real” Measure  Ψ
P




3 = Y - FG
* - FS
* - θY 
 
Here, an interpretation of output, Ψ, superscripted by P refers to the realization of a successful 
rebellion.  Ψ superscripted by R refers to the realized event of regime change.  Simple measures 





1 as the “peace dividend” – additional output that would be enjoyed if conflict were avoided.  
While the difference between columns in table 2 is constant across rows, such a “naïve” measure 
ignores the possibility that resources devoted to conflict could have been employed in otherwise 
productive activities.  An “empirical” measure of output (GDP, for example), is actually closer to 
Ψ
P
2 in time of peace and Ψ
R
2 in periods of civil conflict, since resources devoted by the subject 
population to conflict are not included formally in measures of an economy.  This definition, 
referred to in row 2 as the “Empirical” Measure of the peace dividend is the most common in the 
economic literature on conflict
8.  In contrast the interpretations of output in row 3 are derived 
directly from equation 12.  The equations from this row show that even the observed measure of 
                                                 
8 For a very thorough analysis of the peace dividend with respect to international conflict and disarmament, see the 
authoritative Gleditsch, et al (1996).  An insightful example of this approach is employed in Harris (1999).     18
the “peace” dividend is incomplete.  The true costs of conflict are borne by autocratic states in 
every year of peace through the resources devoted to conflict shown in Ψ
P
3.  Additionally, to 
differentiate between the common understanding of the peace dividend with regards to 
international conflict and the present definition with regards to kleptocratic regimes, the term 
“civil peace dividend” is employed. 





2 is defined as the “conflict wedge”.  This is the direct effect of a lack of cooperation on 
output.  The sum of FG
* and FS
* are defined as they have been used throughout this paper, as the 
“conflict resources” or “resources devoted to conflict”.  Finally, the “civil peace dividend” is 
defined as the sum of the conflict resources and conflict wedge.  To reiterate: 




2 = θY         (13a) 




3  = FG
* +  FS
*       (13b) 




3  = FG
* +  FS
* + θY   (13c) 
 
2.4 In Contrast, the Democracy Game 
  In the development of the model in section 2.1, the variable θ is identified as the 
“cooperation” effect – the part of output that would be lost if the regime was overthrown.  Later, 
in the analysis of the model, it is shown that this share of output is claimed completely by the 
elites as their entitlement from governing.  In addition, the optimal tax rate beyond this 
entitlement is a proportional function of the size of this entitlement.  These effects are direct 
results of the asymmetry of the tax setting privilege of the elites in a kleptocracy.  Finally at the 
end of section 2.3, this portion of output is defined as the conflict wedge, since for autocratic 
regimes, it clearly has little to do with cooperation; in fact, equations 9a and 9b illustrate that the 
resources devoted to conflict for both groups are increasing functions of this conflict wedge in 
such regimes. 
  The paradox of the state lies in this conflict wedge.  Both groups could conceivably 
benefit from the cooperation through more output; however, due to the asymmetry of autocracy, 
only the elites receive θ and therefore, efforts to overthrow the regime are direct threats to this 
portion of the elites’ income.  As θ increases, the elites’ share from “cooperation” (maintaining 
power) becomes larger and they have more incentive to protect this share.  As decomposition of   19
the peace dividend at the end of section 2.3 illustrates, output is reduced not just by the conflict 
wedge, but also by the additional resources devoted to conflict due to the size of the wedge. 
  The asymmetry that results in this effect is a direct result of the assumptions in the model.  
Assumptions of asymmetry where one group has the capacity to set policy seem reasonable when 
modeling an autocracy.  In contrast, consider a simple model of a democracy using similar 
mechanisms and the same variables, but allowing the share θ to be divided through political 
competition.  The democracy game follows a similar format to the autocracy game presented in 
section 2.2: 
1.    The state of the economy is revealed to both players, including Y, γ, λ and θ. 
2.    Both players devote political conflict resources toward competition for θ. 
3.    Payoffs are realized for each group dependent on this contest. 
In the democracy game no advantage is given to either group.  There is no additional stage of tax 
setting and no backwards induction.  Also, there is an implicit guarantee of “property rights” that 
is not present in the autocracy game, where the governing elites can appropriate part of λ.  For 
simplicity the same notation, G and S, is kept for the two groups, though they are only defined by 
their relative shares now.  The superscript D is used to denote the variables and following 
solutions associated with the democracy game: 
  E(Y
D
G) = (γ + (1 - π
D)θ)Y - F
D
G           (14a) 
  E(Y
D
S) = (λ + π
Dθ)Y - F
D
S            (14b) 
  In the democracy game the “elites”, G, expect γY plus some share of θY less their 
resources devoted to political competition, F
D
G.  The “subjects”, S, expect λY plus a share of θY, 
less their expenditure on political competition, F
D
G.  Assume that the contest success function, 
π





G, following the same form as the CSF in the autocracy game, but with μ=1 (both 











= π          ( 1 5 )  
Assuming risk neutral players, this contest can either represent the probability in a winner take 
all contest or a determinant of the share in a splitting the pie contest.  The Nash Equilibrium 
solution for this contest is: 
  F
D*
S  = F
D*
G = ¼θY          ( 1 6 )    20
  π
D* =   ½          ( 1 7 )  
Here it might be more reasonable to allow for the possibility of negotiated settlements that could 
reduce resources spent on political competition.  However, to keep the results comparable with 
those from the autocracy game, this possibility is excluded (new, weak democracies like those 
that might develop out of autocracies might not yet have the institutions necessary to enforce 
such negotiations).     
  With a few assumptions these results can be directly compared to the results for the 
autocracy game given in section 2.  Let μ=1 in the autocracy game and assume that: 
γ = λ =  ½(1-θ)         ( 1 8 )  
With these assumptions there is no functional difference between the two groups in the 
democracy game, and the only difference between them in the autocracy game is in their 
asymmetry (i.e., who answers the phone in the capital).  Under these assumptions, solutions from 
equations 9a and 9b can be compared to equation 16 to show that resources devoted to civil 
conflict are greater for the governing elites under autocracy than democracy, whereas the 
resources devoted by the subjects are greater under democracy than autocracy (F
*
G  >  F
D*
G  and  
F
*
S >  F
D*
S). The governing elites prefer autocracy to democracy because they receive the 
entitlement from the conflict wedge and can appropriate some of the resources from what would 
otherwise be protected in a democracy.  This is exactly the nature of kleptocrats invoked at the 
outset of the paper.  Figure 3 illustrates this preference graphically over the range of 0 < θ < .5 














Elite and Subject Share under Democracy
Elite Share under Autocracy




Figure 3:  Shares of Income under Autocracy and Democracy for Identical Groups 
 
Figure 3 shows that the elites’ share under autocracy is larger than their share under democracy 
for all levels of θ.  The subjects’ share, meanwhile, is lower than their share under democracy.  
Additionally the peace dividend, the difference between 1 and the total income under autocracy 
and the resources devoted to conflict under autocracy are included in the figure.  The expected 
conflict wedge (weighted by the probability of successful regime change, ie. πθ) is graphically 
represented as the difference between the peace dividend curve and the total conflict resources 
curve.  As the wedge increases, income of the elites and the total resources devoted to conflict 
increase.   
  This exercise explains why elites prefer maintaining costly autocracies even in the 
presence of seemingly large benefits from cooperation.   Given reasonable assumptions on non-
credible negotiations, it seems that the only hopes that disenfranchised subjects have for 
democratization are shifts in the relative shares that either group expects from rebellion or shifts 
in the decisiveness parameter, μ.  As explained in section 2.3, a drop in this decisiveness 
parameter actually reduces the need for extreme autocracy on the part of the elites. 
  This paper used a very simple, static game to capture the first-order incentives of two 
actors in fighting for regime change out of kleptocracy.  The model was kept intentionally 
memoryless and myopic without dynamic effects so that the first order effects of division and   22
size of the pie could be developed and discussed.  However, there are some clues that suggest 
that μ might be useful in peaceful transitions from autocracy to democracy.  For example, the 
optimal tax rate determined in equation 7 and the level of conflict in equation 8 both suggest 
corner solutions where subjects don’t invest in conflict resources when μ < ½.  Thus, μ might be 
a good starting point for considering future extensions to the model for future papers that 
incorporate changes over time.   As a preview of such models, set θ = .2, γ = λ =.4 and consider 
income shares for both groups in the autocracy games over the range 0 > μ > 5, illustrated in 
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Figure 4: Nash Equilibrium Income Shares under the Autocracy Game and Democracy Game 
 
Figure 4 plots the solution incomes from the static autocracy and the democracy games, allowing 
the decision variable, μ, in the autocracy game to vary.  For higher levels of μ, income is 
decreasing for the elites.  This effect is non-monotonic for the subjects; their income is 
decreasing in μ for low levels of μ, and increasing for higher levels.  The constant solution 
income for the comparator democracy game is included as well, a reminder of what the elites 
could have if they switched to democracy.  Clearly, for extremely high levels of μ the elites 
would be better off simply abrogating into democracy – since their income from autocracy is 
below the democracy income, because of their costly conflict in trying to protect the conflict 
wedge.  However, from equation 8 it should be noted that a level of μ = 4, for example, suggests   23
a probability of successful regime change of 70%.   Elites might consider themselves lucky to 
have the option to declare democracy in such an environment.  More realistic levels of μ are 
found to the left of the Figure 4.  In this range the elites have no incentive to switch to 
democracy because they are receiving a large portion of the conflict wedge, even net of the 
resources necessary to protect it.  In this range, though, the elites do have an incentive to reduce 
μ to increase their income.  Note from equation 7, that τ* is increasing in μ so a reduction in μ 
would result in a corresponding reduction in τ and an increase in democracy.  This suggests an 
opening for future investigations.  If elites are able to invest in infrastructure with positive 
externalities on growth following on Fearon (2005) or diversify the economy away from easily 
targeted primary commodities (Ross, 2004), then dynamic effects might be possible that 
encourage elites to reinvest out of their own personal interest and, simultaneously, reduce 
conflict and promote democracy.   
Other possibilities for future investigations involve assumptions on shares.  Is it possible 
for subjects to push for democracy by reinvesting in agriculture and other non-appropriable 
productive assets, and do elites protect their autocracies by promoting only investments that can 
be easily looted in the event of rebellion?  Perhaps this is the mechanism through which natural 
resources contribute to the fragility of autocratic states.  Another future exploration would 
involve the nature of anocracy: why do so many regimes fail when trying to pass through the 
gauntlet of democratization?   Is the fragility of transition a result of the changing   All of these 
questions feed into the larger question of whether or not there are stable political paths that 
autocrats might follow to ensure their political survival and/or enrichment, yet might ultimately 
lead to democratization.   
 
4. Conclusion and Implications 
This paper began with some observations on the longevity of autocratic regimes and the 
phenomenon that longer-lived autocratic regimes are more likely to transition into democracies.  
A model of political survival was introduced to explain this phenomenon.  The model 
demonstrated that the asymmetry of power in domestic policy setting guarantees that governing 
elites can appropriate from their subject populations and that elites will protect this power with 
tremendous resources devoted to security.  Furthermore it was demonstrated that the share of 
income normally attributed to “cooperation” in democratic states should really be defined as a   24
“conflict wedge” in kleptocracies.   These results have important implications for the survival of 
autocratic regimes. 
  Using comparative statics on equation 7, it can be shown that the level of autocracy 
(proxied by the tax rate) is increasing in the share of resources guaranteed to the elites, 
increasing in the conflict wedge and decreasing in the share of resources guaranteed to the 
subject population.  The discussion that followed equation 7 demonstrated that this relationship 
is complex, since equation 1 implies that these shares are mutually constrained to sum to 1.  
Differencing equation 7 yields an equation where the tax rate (level of autocoracy) is only 
increasing if changes in γ are not offset by changes in θ. As noted in section 2.2 of the paper, this 
suggests that the level of autocracy is not only a direct function of inequality (the ratio of γ to λ), 
but instead a function of the relationship between inequality, cooperation and development.  This 
relationship is represented in Table 3: 
Table 3:  Role of Elite’s Share, γ, and the Conflict Wedge, θ, in Determining the Level of Autocracy, 
A 
  ∆θ>0  ∆θ<0 
∆γ>0  A↑ 




1 +  then A↑ 




1 +  then A↓ 
∆γ<0 




1 +  then A↑ 




1 +  then A↓ 
A↓ 
 
Identifying the conflict wedge and conflict resources separately allowed for a more 
precise definition of the “civil peace dividend” foregone due to conflict or the threat of conflict 
in autocratic states.    Since the conflict wedge in only observed when rebellion is successful, the 
civil peace dividend is approximated by combinations of more naïve measures.  While the 
conflict wedge may be difficult to measure and approach empirically, figures 3 and 4 and table 3 
above demonstrates how important the conflict wedge can be in determining the civil peace 
dividend and explaining why some autocracies are able to survive and navigate peacefully 
toward democratic transition while others seem to revert to authoritarian rule until overthrown.   25
Finally, the implication of the conflict wedge was considered in both the autocracy game 
and a simple democracy game.  It was shown that the conflict wedge is doubly damaging to 
autocratic regimes: through both resources lost to regime failure and the conflict resources 
devoted to avoiding regime change.  Further comparisons of the democracy and autocracy games 
suggested areas for future research; including investments in reducing the decisiveness of 
conflict, which has a positive spillover on democratization.  Such paths would have important 
policy implications; while kleptocrats may not be the first best choice as shepherds of states 
toward democracy, they may be preferable to the fly-by-night autocracies and periods of 
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Appendix  
 
Regimes and Regime Type 
Autocracies (Polity<3) and Limited Democracies (Polity>2) 
1960 to 2003 
 
Country Years Regime  Type
9 (Rule)  PRIO Civil War
10  Przeworski Regime Type
11 
 
Afghanistan  1933-73 Autocracy  (Shah)  1978-2001  (G) 
  1974-77 Autocracy  (Daoud) 
  1978  Lack of State (Khalq/Parcham) 
 1979-86  Autocracy  (Karmal)
12 
 1987-92  Autocracy  (Najibullah) 
  1993-95  Lack of State (Rabbani) 
 1996-2001  Autocracy  (Taliban)   
 
 
Albania   1945-90  Autocracy (Albanian Communist Party)     
 1991-97  Limited  Democracy (Democratic Party)
13 
 1997-eos
14  Limited Democracy (Socialist Party)  
 
 
Algeria  1962-91  Autocracy    1955-61 (G)  1962-64 (B) 
    (Front de Libération Nationale (FLN),    1965-76 (A) 
   Armée  de  Libération Nationale)    1977-90 (B) 
 1992-94  Autocracy
15   1993-2001 (G) 
 1995-eos  Autocracy  (Pouteflika/Military) 
 
 
                                                 
9 Distinction is only made here between autocracies and limited democracies.  Autocracies are any state with polity 
scores lower than 3.  States with a polity score of 3 or greater are referred to as “Limited Democracies” to reflect the 
difficulty that all governments (including Western  OECD countries) face in forming true democracies.  Even states 
with a polity score of 10 are referred to as Limited Democracies. 
10 The International Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) compiles civil war data for all countries from 1946 to 2003 in their 
Armed Conflicts Database (Gleditsch, N.P., P. Wallensteen, M. Eriksson, M. Sollenberg and H. Strand, 2002).  Civil wars 
included here are defined as major civil wars in the PRIO data set, wars in which battle deaths exceeded 1,000 per annum.  Civil 
wars are identified as two types: those for control of the government (G) and those for secession or autonomous control of 
territory (T). 
11 Przeworski, et al. (2000) divide political regimes into two groups, autocracies and democracies.  They further subdivide each 
group.  Autocracies are divided into totalitarian autocracies (A) and bureaucratic autocracies (B).  Democracies are divided by 
presidential system (E) and parliamentary system (P).   For a few cases mixed (M) systems are identified, see original source for 
details. 
12 Afghanistan lacked state functions during 1978 and early 1979 as factional fighting between the Khalq (Masses) 
led by Nur Muhammad Taraki and the Parcham (Banner) forces led by Babrak Karmal.  A coup by Hafizullah Amin 
claimed the government from Taraki in September 1979, however it was overthrown by Karbal in December 1979. 
13 Popular uprising in 1997, followed by limited government, state failure – peace restored by European peacekeeping force. 
14 Sample ends December 31
st, 2003, so regimes that survive through the end of 2003 survive until end of sample (eos). 
15 Civil war resumes after government asserts power, cancels election results and bans Front Islamique du Salut (FIS).   28
Angola 1975-91  Autocracy
16   1975-94 (G)  1975-79 (A) 
        1980-90  (B) 
 1992-2001  Autocracy
17     1998-2001 (G) 
 2002-eos  Autocracy   
 
 
Argentina 1955-62  Autocracy
18   1958-61  (E) 
         1962  (A) 
 1963-65  Autocracy  (Illia)    1963-65  (E) 
 1966-72  Autocracy  (Ongania)    1966-72  (A) 
  1973-75  Limited Democracy (Cordobaza, Peron)
19  1975 (G)  1973-75 (E) 
        
 1976-82  Autocracy
20     1976-82 (A) 
  1983-eos  Limited Democracy    1983-90 (E) 
 
Armenia 1991-1995  Limited  Democracy 
 1996-eos  Autocracy  (Kocharian) 
 
 
Azerbaijan 1992-eos  Autocracy    1992-94  (T) 
    (Aliyev, New Azerbaijan Party)  
 
 
Bahrain  1971-eos  Autocracy (Al Khalifah)    1971-72 (A) 
        1973-74  (B) 
        1975-90  (A) 
 
 
Bangladesh  1972-75  Autocracy (M. Rahman, Awami League)    1972-74 (B) 
        1975-78  (A) 
 1976-81  Autocracy      1979-81  (B) 
    (Z. Rahman, Bangladesh National Party (BNP))    
 1982-90  Autocracy      1982-85  (A) 
    (Ershad, Jaliya Party)    1986-90 (E) 
 1991-95  Limited  Democracy 




Belarus  1991-94  Limited Democracy (Shushevich) 
  1995-eos  Autocracy (Lukashenka, Communist Party) 
 
 
                                                 
16 Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) was marginally in control, though Jonas Savimba’s National Union 
for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) fought until cease-
fire signed in 1991. 
17 After free and fair elections, Savimba rejects results, war breaks out again.  Civil war ends with the death of Savimba, Dos 
Santos placed in power. 
18 Peron overthrown by coup, 1955. 
19 After Peron was reelected there were massive uprisings and radical opposition from revolutionary guerrilla groups.  After 
Peron’s death in 1974 there was an escalation of violence on both sides. 
20 Return to autocracy in 1976 after coup ousts faltering government. 
21 1996 elections not accepted by Awami League, agitation pushed BNP into resigning, new elections held.   29
Benin  1960-62  Autocracy       1960-64 (B) 
    (Maga, Mouvement Démocratique du Dahomey) 
 1963  Autocracy  (Soglo) 
 1964  Autocracy  (Apithy,  Ahomadegbe) 
 1965-66  Autocracy  (Soglo)
22   1965-78  (A) 
 1967  Autocracy  (Kouandete) 
 1968  Autocracy  (Zinsou) 
  1969  Autocracy (De Souza, Sinzogan and Kouandete) 
 1970-71  Limited  Democracy
23 
 1972-89  Autocracy  (Kerekou)    1979-89  (B) 
  1990-eos  Limited Democracy (Soglo, Kerekou)
24   1990  (A) 
 
 
Bhutan  1907-eos  Autocracy (Wangchuk since 1972) 
 
 
Bolivia 1952-63  Autocracy      1956-63  (B) 
   (Movimiento  Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR)) 
 1964-68  Autocracy  (Barrientos)    1964-78  (A) 
 1969  Autocracy
25 
 1970  Autocracy  (Torres) 
 1971-77  Autocracy  (Banzar) 
  1978-79  Limited Democracy (Tejada)    1979 (E) 
  1980-81  Autocracy (Meza, Suazo)    1980-81 (A) 
 1982-eos  Limited  Democracy
26   1982-90  (E) 
 
 
Brazil  1945-64  Limited Democracy     1950-60 (E) 
        1961-62  (M) 
         1963  (E) 
        1964-67  (B) 
  1965-84  Autocracy (Castello Branco)    1968-69 (A) 
        1970-78  (B) 
  1985-eos  Limited Democracy    1979-90 (E) 
 
 
Bulgaria  1945-89  Autocracy (Bulgarian Communist Party)    1950-89 (B) 
  1990-eos  Limited Democracy    1990 (P) 
 
 
Burkina 1959-65  Autocracy      1960-65  (B) 
Faso    (Yaméogo, Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA)) 
 1966-70  Autocracy  (Lamizana)    1966-69  (A) 
 1971-73  Autocracy  (RDA)    1970-73  (B) 
 1974-77  Autocracy      1974-77  (A) 
  1978-79  Limited Democracy (RDA)    1978-79 (B) 
 1980-81  Autocracy  (Zerbo)    1980-90  (A) 
 1982  Autocracy  (Ouédraogo) 
 1983-86  Autocracy  (Sankara)   
 1987-eos  Autocracy  (Campaoré) 
 
 
                                                 
22 Soglo took control after Unified party of Apithy and Ahomadegbe dissolves. 
23 Maga first of presidential council to take power, Kerekou overthrows council in coup while Ahomadegbe in power of 
presidential council and politically incapacitated by alliance of Maga and Apithy. 
24 Nacional Sovereign Conference (NSC) paves the way for peaceful transition to democracy.  Nicephore Soglo named prime 
minister to accompany newly limited presidency of Kerekou. 
25 Barrientos dies in helicopter accident, successor Luis Adolfo Siles Salinas replaced by General Alfredo Ovanda Candia by 
military. 
26 Coalition governments composed of Acción Democrática Nacionalista (ADN), Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria 
(MIR) and MNR.   30
Burundi 1962-65  Autocracy  (Mwambutsa)    1962-65  (B) 
  1966-92  Autocracy (Micombero, Buyoya)    1966-81 (A) 
        1982-86  (B) 
        1987-90  (A) 
  1993-95  Limited Democracy (Ndadaye) 
 1996-2000  Autocracy  (Buyoya)  1998  (G) 
 2001-eos  Limited  Democracy
27 2000-02  (G) 
 
        
Cambodia 1955-69  Autocracy  (Sihanouk)  1967  (G) 
 1970-74  Autocracy    1970-75  (G) 
  1975-78  Autocracy (Pol Pot, Khmer Rouge)  1978 (G) 
  1979-88  Lack of State
28 
 1989-91  Autocracy    1989  (G) 
    (Cambodian People’s Party (CPP)) 
 1992-96  Autocracy
29 
 1997-eos  Autocracy   
 
 
Cameroon 1960-81  Autocracy  (Ahidjo)    1960-70  (B) 
        1971-72  (A) 
 1982-eos  Autocracy        1973-90  (B) 
    (Biya, Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM)) 
 
 
Central 1960-64  Autocracy  (Dacko)    1960-65  (B) 
African 1965-78  Autocracy  (Bokassa)    1966-86  (A) 
Republic  1979-80 Autocracy  (Dacko) 
 1981-92  Autocracy  (Kolingba)    1987-90  (B) 
  1993-2002  Limited Democracy (Patassé) 
 2003-eos  Autocracy  (Bozize) 
 
 
Chad 1960-74  Autocracy    1965-88  (G)  1960-74 
(B) 
    (Tombabaye, Parti Progressiste Tchadien)   
 1975-78  Autocracy  (Malloum)    1975-90  (A) 
  1979-81  Lack of State
30  
 1982-89  Autocracy  (Habre) 
 1990-eos  Autocracy  (Deby)  1990  (G) 
 
 
Chile 1932-72  Limited  Democracy
31   1950-72  (E) 
 1973-88  Autocracy  (Pinochet)    1973-89  (A) 
  1989-eos  Limited Democracy    1990 (E) 
 
 
China  1949-eos  Autocracy (Chinese Communist Party (CCP))    1950-53 (A) 
        1954-90  (B) 
 
 
Colombia  1957-eos  Limited Democracy  1989-90 (G)   
       1992-93 (G) 
       1998-2002  (G) 
 
                                                 
27 Transitional government with power-sharing agreements signed immediately after end of sample. 
28 Cambodia occupied by Vietnam, operated as satellite. 
29 Sihanouk restored to power under UN Protectorate.  In 1996 Hun Sen staged coup to regain power. 
30 Weak coalition government formed by Goukouni Weddeye, Front de Libération Nationale du Tchad (FROLINAT)).  Arguably 
non-existent state: southern territories functioned as independent states, northern states controlled by independent warlords. 
31 Allende elected in 1970.   31
 
Comoros  1975  Limited Democracy (Abdallah)    1975-77 (A) 
  1976-77  Autocracy (Ali Soilih) 
 1978-89  Autocracy  (Abdallah)    1978-90  (B) 
  1990-94  Limited Democracy (Djohar) 
 1995  Autocracy
32 
  1996-98  Limited Democracy (Abdulkarim Taki) 
 1999-eos  Autocracy  (Assoumani)   
 
 
Congo  1960-62  Limited Democracy (Youlou)    1960-62 (E) 
(Brazzaville) 1963-67  Autocracy  (Masemba-Debat)    1963-76  (B) 
 1968-90  Autocracy      1977-78  (A) 
    (Ngouabi, Sassou-Nguesso, Parti Congolais du Travail (PCT))  1979-90 (B) 
  1991  Lack of State
33  
  1992-96  Limited Democracy  
    (Lissouba, Panafricaine pur la Democratie Sociale (UPADS)) 
 1997-eos  Autocracy  (Sassou-Nguesso)  1997-98  (G) 
 
 
Congo  1960  Limited Democracy      1960 (A) 
(Kinshasha)    (Lumumba,  Mouvement National Congolais (MNC))     
  1961-64  Autocracy    1964-65 (G)  1961-62 (B) 
        1963-69  (A) 
 1965-96  Autocracy  (Mobutu)    1970-90  (B) 
  1997-eos  Autocracy (L. Kabila, J. Kabila)
34   1997-2000  (G) 
  
 
Croatia 1991-99  Autocracy   
   (Tudjman,  Croatian  Democratic Union (HDZ)) 
  2000-eos  Limited Democracy  
   (Mesic,  Six-party  coalition government) 
 
 
Cuba 1959-eos  Autocracy  (Castro)  1958  (G) 
 
 
Cyprus 1963-73  Limited  Democracy   
  1974  State Failure (War)  1974 (T) 
 1975-eos  Limited  Democracy 
 
 
Djibouti 1977-98  Autocracy  (Aptidon)    1977-1990  (B) 
  1999-eos  Limited Democracy (Guelleh) 
 
 
Dominican 1930-61  Autocracy  (Molina)    1950-61  (B) 
Republic  1962  Limited Democracy    1962-65 (A) 
    (Bosch, Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD)) 
 1963-65  Autocracy   
 1966-77  Autocracy  (Balaguer)    1966-90  (E) 
  1978-eos  Limited Democracy (Bosch, Balaguer) 
 
 
                                                 
32 Djohar killed in coup. 
33 Transition government, party state regime abolished at Nacional Conference. 
34 Despite Laurent Kabila’s assassination in 2001, transition to presidency for Joseph Kabila was without incident and the 
familial legacy suggests that this regime should be coded as one continuous regime.   32
Ecuador  1948-62  Limited Democracy    1950-62 (E) 
 1963-67  Autocracy        1963-67  (A) 
  1968-71  Limited Democracy    1968-69 (B) 
        1970-78  (A) 
 1972-78  Autocracy   
  1979-eos  Limited Democracy    1979-90 (E) 
 
 




35  1960  Lack of State    1960 (A) 
 1961-78  Autocracy      1961-83  (B) 
 1979-91  Autocracy
36   1981-90 (G)  1984-90 (E) 
 1992-eos  Limited  Democracy 
 
 
Equatorial   1968-78  Autocracy (F. Nguema) 
Guinea 1979-eos  Autocracy
37 (T. Nguema) 
 
 
Eritrea 1993-eos  Autocracy   
   (Afwerki, People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDI) 
 
Ethiopia 1917-71  Autocracy  (Selassie)    1950-56  (A) 
        1957-73  (B) 
  1972-90  Autocracy (The Dergue)  1976-91 (G)  1974-86 (A) 
        1974-91 (G/T)  1987-90 (B) 
 1991-eos  Autocracy 
    (Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)) 
 
 
Fiji  1970-86  Limited Democracy    1970-86 (B) 
 1987-89  Autocracy  (Rabuka)    1987-90  (A) 
 1990-eos  Limited  Democracy 
 
 
Gabon  1961-66  Autocracy (Mba)     1960-90 (B) 
  1967-eos  Autocracy (Bongo, Parti Démocratique Gabonais) 
 
 
Gambia  1965-93  Limited Democracy    1965-90 (B) 
 1994-eos  Autocracy  (Jammeh)     
 
 
Ghana 1957-65  Autocracy  (Nkrumah)    1957-64  (B) 
 1966-71  Autocracy      1965-69  (A) 
   (Army-Police  Alliance, National Liberation Council (NLC)  1970-71 (E) 
 1972-78  Autocracy  (Acheampong)    1972-78  (A) 
  1979-80  Autocracy (Limann)     1979-80 (E) 
 1981-91  Autocracy      1981-90  (A) 
   (Provisional  National  Defense Council (PNDC)) 
 1992-eos  Autocracy 
38 
                                                 
35 Popular unrest and lack of respected leadership qualifies El Salvador in 1960 as a failed state.  Lt. Colonel Julio Adalberto 
Rivera seized power in 1961 and power was passed on without incident to his successor Colonel Fidel Sánchez Hernández under 
the guidance of the military, qualifying the successive terms of the two autocrats to be counted as one autocratic regime. 
36 Army leadership was ousted by reformists; civil war began, guerrillas captured the capital city in 1989. 
37 The assassination of Francisco Nguema, coup d’etat and rise to power that followed by his nephew Teodoro Nguema suggest 
that these two regimes were separate entities with no legacy effect between them.   33
 
 
Greece  1950-66  Limited Democracy    1950-66 (P) 
 1967-74  Autocracy      1967-70  (A) 
        1971-73  (B) 
        1974-90  (P) 
 1975-eos  Limited  Democracy     
 
 
Guatemala 1957-62  Autocracy  (Fuentes)    1958-62  (E) 
 1963-81  Autocracy
39   1969-87 (G)  1963-65 (A) 
        1966-81  (E) 
 1982  Autocracy    1982-85  (B) 
 1983-95  Autocracy  (Victores)    1986-90  (E) 
 1996-eos  Limited  Democracy 
 
Guinea 1958-83  Autocracy      1958-83  (B) 
    (Sékou Touré, Parti Démocratique de Guinée (PDG)) 
 1984-eos  Autocracy      1984-90  (A) 
    (Conté, Conseil Militaire de Redressment National (CMRN)) 
 
 
Guinea- 1974-79  Autocracy  (Cabral)    1974-90  (B) 
Bissau  1980-97  Autocracy (Vieira, Revolutionary Council) 
 1998  Autocracy  (Mane)  1998  (G) 
 1999-2002  Limited  Democracy 
 2003-eos  Autocracy  (Rosa) 
 
  
Guyana 1966-eos  Autocracy
40     1966-90 (B) 
        
 
Haiti 1957-85  Autocracy
41 (F. Duvalier, J.C. Duvalier)    1950-85 (B) 
  1986-89  Limited Democracy    1986-89 (A) 
  1990  Limited Democracy (Aristide)    1990-90 (B) 
 1991-93  Autocracy   
  1994-eos  Limited Democracy (Aristide) 
 
 
Honduras 1955-62  Autocracy  (Morales)    1957-62  (E) 
 1963-69  Autocracy  (Arellano)    1963-64  (A) 
        1965-70  (B) 
  1970-71  Autocracy (Cruz, National Party)    1971-71 (E) 
  1972-77  Autocracy (Arellano, Castro)    1972-81 (A) 
 1978-81  Autocracy  (Garcia)     
  1982-eos  Limited Democracy    1982-90 (E) 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
38 The PNDC was transformed into National Democratic Congress (NDC) in 1992 along with founding of a new constitution and 
a return to multi-party politics.  Despite democratic advances including elections and peaceful transfer of power, the polity score 
for Ghana through the end of the sample recommend it for coding as an autocracy. 
39 While there was peaceful transfer of power between the presidencies over this period, failed constraints on executive power, a 
lasting insurgency and a slow erosion of democracy suggest that the leaders during this period enjoyed the legacy effect of a 
common autocratic regime.  Presidents during this period included (in order of succession) Alfredo Enrique Peralta Azurdia, 
Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro, Carlos Manuel Arana Osorio, Kjell Eugenio Laugerud García, and Rome Lucas Garcia.  A 
coup in 1982 interrupted this cycle and presented another peaceful transition of power. 
40 Peaceful transitions, familial relationship (Dr. Cheddi Jagan, Janet Jagan) and dominance of the People’s National Congress 
suggest that governance for Guyana over the sample period was largely single-party rule best represented by one autocratic 
regime. 
41 The transition of authority from Francois Duvalier to Jean-Claude Duvalier is the textbook example of autocratic legacy.  The 
younger Duvalier fled the country after popular unrest in 1989.  A provisional government governed democratically until Aristide 
was elected in 1990.   34
 
Hungary  1956-88  Autocracy (Kadar, Communist Party)  1956 (G)  1950-89 (B) 
  1989-eos  Limited Democracy    1990 (E) 
 
 
Indonesia 1959-64 Autocracy  (Sukarno)    1957-59  (B) 
        1960-70  (A) 
 1965-67  Autocracy   
  1968-98  Autocracy (Suharto)  1975-78 (G/T)  1971-90 (B) 
       1976-78  (G/T) 
 1999-eos  Limited  Democracy 
 
 
Iran 1953-78  Autocracy  (Shah)    1950-60  (B) 
        1961-62  (A) 
        1963-83  (B) 
  1979-eos  Autocracy (Ayatollah Khomeini)  1979-80 (T/G)  1984-1990 (A) 
       1981-82  (G) 
       1982  (T/G) 
 
 
Iraq  1958-62  Autocracy (al-Karim Qasim)  1961-63 (T/G)  1958-79 (A) 
 1963-67  Autocracy  (Nasserists)  1965-66  (T/G)   
 1968-78  Autocracy  (Ba’athists)  1969  (T/G) 
       1974-75  (T/G) 
  1979-2002  Autocracy (Hussein)  1988 (T/G)  1980-1990 (B) 
       1991  (T/G) 
       1991  (G) 
  2003-eos  Lack of State 
 
 
Côte d’Ivoire 1960-98  Autocracy     1960-90  (B) 
    (Houphouët-Boigny, Bedié, Parti Démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI))     
 1999  Autocracy  (Guei) 
  2000-eos  Limited Democracy (Gbagbo) 
 
 
Jordan 1953-eos  Autocracy  (Hussein)    1950-65  (B) 
         1966  (A) 
        1967-73  (B) 
        1974-83  (A) 
         1984  (B) 
        1985-88  (A) 
        1989-90  (B) 
 
 
Kazakhstan 1991-eos  Autocracy  (Nazarbayev) 
 
 
Kenya 1963-2001  Autocracy      1963-90  (B) 
    (Kenyatta, Moi, Kenya Africa National Union (KANU)),  
  2002-eos  Limited Democracy (Kibaki) 
 
 
Korea, North 1948-eos  Autocracy (Kim S. Il, Kim J. Il) 
 
  
Republic of  1960  Limited Democracy    1960-60 (P) 
Korea  1961-78  Autocracy (Military) (Park)    1961-71 (B) 
         1972  (A) 
 1979-86  Autocracy  (Dhun)    1973-87  (B) 
  1987-eos  Limited Democracy    1988-90 (E)   35
 
 
Kuwait 1963-89  Autocracy  (Emir)    1963-75  (B) 
        1976-80  (A) 
        1981-85  (B) 
        1986-90  (A) 
  1990  Lack of State 
 1991-eos  Autocracy  (Emir) 
 
 
Kyrgyzstan 1991-eos  Autocracy  (Akayev) 
 
 
Laos  1360-1974  Autocracy    1959-61 (G)  1954-58 (P) 
        1963-73 (G)  1959-1965 (B) 
         1966  (A) 
        1967-73  (B) 
        1974-90  (A) 
  1975-eos   (Lao People’s Revolutionary Party) 
 
 
Lebanon  1958-74  Autocracy (General Fouad Chehab)  1958 (G) 
  1975-89  Lack of State (Civil War)  1976 (T) 
       1980-82  (T) 
       1989-90  (T) 
 1990-eos  Limited  Democracy 
 
 
Lesotho  1966-69  Autocracy (Constitutional Monarchy under Moshoeshoe)  1966-69 (B) 
 1970-92  Autocracy  (Jonathan)    1970-90  (A) 
  1993-97  Limited Democracy (Moshoeshoe) 




Liberia 1960-69  Autocracy  (Tubman)    1950-79  (B) 
 1970-79  Autocracy  (Tolbert)   
 1980-89  Autocracy  (Doe)    1980-84  (A) 
        1985-89  (B) 
  1990-95  Lack of State (Civil War)  1990 (G)  1990 (A) 
       1992  (G) 
 1996-2002  Autocracy  (Taylor)   
  2003-eos  Lack of State (Civil War)   
 
 
Libya 1960-68  Autocracy  (al-Sanusi) 
 1969-eos  Autocracy  (Qaddafi) 
 
 
Madagascar 1960-71  Autocracy  (Tsiranana)    1960-71  (B) 
 1972-74  Autocracy      1972-76  (A) 
 1975-91  Autocracy  (Rasiraka)    1977-90  (B) 
  1992-eos  Limited Democracy (Zafy, Ratsiraka, Ravalomanana) 
 
 
Malawi  1964-93  Autocracy (Hastings Kamuza Banda)    1964-90 (B) 
  1994-eos  Limited Democracy  
    (Bakili Muluzi, United Democratic Front (UDF)) 
 
 
                                                 
42 Military intervention by South Africa and Botswana has restored momentum towards democratization.   36
Mali 1960-67  Autocracy      1960-67  (B) 
    (Kéïta, Union Soudanaise-Rassemblement Démocratique (USRDA)) 
 1968-90  Autocracy  (Military)    1968-81  (A) 
    (Traoré, Comité Militaire de Libération Nationale (CMLN))  1982-90 (B) 
 1991  Autocracy  (Touré) 
 1992-eos  Limited  Democracy 
 
 
Mauritania 1960-77  Autocracy      1960-77  (B) 
    (Daddah, Parti du People Mauritanien) 
 1978-eos  Autocracy  (Taya)    1978-90  (A) 
        
 
Mexico  1930-99  Autocracy (Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI))  1950-90 (B) 
 2000-eos  Limited  Democracy 
 
 
Mongolia 1952-91 Autocracy  (Tsedenbal)    1950-90  (B) 
 1992-eos  Limited  Democracy 
 
 
Morocco  1957-eos  Autocracy     1975-80 (G/T)  1956-62 (A) 
        1963-64  (B) 
        1965-69  (A) 
        1970-71  (B) 
        1972-76  (A) 
        1977-90  (B) 
 
 
Mozambique 1975-93  Autocracy
43   1981-92 (G)  1975-90 (B) 
 1994-eos  Limited  Democracy   
 
 
Myanmar  1960-61  Limited Democracy  1961-75 (T/G) 
(Burma)  1962-eos  Autocracy (Ne Win)  1964-70 (T)  1962-73 (A) 
        1968-78 (G)  1974-87 (B) 
        1992 (T/G)  1988-89 (A) 
        1994 (T)  1990 (B) 
          
 
 
Nepal 1960-89  Autocracy  (Mahendra)    1960-62  (A) 
        1963-90  (B) 
 1990-2001  Limited  Democracy 
 2002-eos  Autocracy  (Gayanendra)  2002-eos  (G) 
 
 
Nicaragua  1936-78  Autocracy    1978-79 (G)  1950-70 (B) 
    (Anastasio, Garcia, Partido Liberal Nacionalista)  1971-71 (A) 
        1972-78  (B) 
  1979-89  Autocracy (Sandinistas)  1983-88 (G)  1979-83 (A) 
        1984-90  (E) 
 1990-eos  Limited  Democracy 
 
 
                                                 
43 Samora Machel, of the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) was in power during this period; however, 
fighting between FRELIMO and the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) persisted over most of this period (1977 to 
1992).   37
Niger 1960-73  Autocracy  (Diouri)    1960-73  (B) 
 1974-86  Autocracy  (Kountche)    1974-90  (A) 
  1987-91  Autocracy (Ali Saibou) 
 1992-95  Limited  Democracy 
 1996-98  Autocracy  (Bare  Mainsassara) 
  1999-eos  Limited Democracy (National Reconciliation Council) 
 
  
Nigeria 1960-65  Limited  Democracy
44   1960-65  (P) 
  1966-78  Autocracy    1967-70 (G)  1966-78 (A) 
  1979-83  Limited Democracy    1979-82 (E) 
        1983-90  (A) 
 1984-88  Autocracy  (Babngida)     
 1989-97  Autocracy  (Abacha) 
 1998-98  Autocracy  (Abubakar) 
  1999-eos  Limited Democracy  
 
 
Oman 1932-69  Autocracy      1951-90  (A) 




Pakistan  1958-68  Autocracy (A. Khan)    1958-61 (A) 
        1962-71  (B) 
 1969-70  Autocracy  (Y.  Khan) 
  1971-76  Limited Democracy (Ali Bhutto)  1971 (G/T)  1972-76 (M) 
       1974  (G/T)   
 1977-87  Autocracy  (Zia-ul-Haq)    1977-84  (A) 
        1985-87  (B) 
  1988-98  Limited Democracy    1988-90 (P) 
 1999-eos  Autocracy  (Musharraf) 
 
 
Panama  1952-67  Limited Democracy    1952-67 (E) 
  1968-68  Lack of State    1968-77 (A) 
 1969-80  Autocracy  (Herrera)    1978-1990  (B) 
 1981-83  Autocracy
46  
 1984-88  Autocracy  (Noriega) 
 1989-eos  Limited  Democracy 
 
 
Paraguay 1954-88 Autocracy  (Stroessner)    1950-90  (B) 




                                                 
44 After independence from the United Kingdom was gained in 1960, Nigeria was governed by a constitutional monarchy as a 
republic.  Thus the short-lived democracy from 1979 to 1983 is referred to as the Second Republic. 
45 Qaboos bin Said al Said ousted his father in 1970 to claim the throne, suggesting a very weak autocratic legacy.  Thus the two 
reigns are defined as two separate regimes despite the technical continuity of the monarchy.  
46 After General Herrera died in a plane crash in 1981, the government candidate won by a very small margin in a highly 
contested election in 1983, still there is little evidence of autocratic legacy between these two leaders, so the periods are defined 
as separate autocratic regimes. 
47 General Andres Rodriguez seizes power from General Stroessner in 1989 and proceeded to extend the democracy.  He was 
replaced by Juan Carlos Wasmosy due to peaceful, public pressure in 1991, suggesting an autocratic legacy.  Wasmosy resisted a 
coup in the attempted Barracks Revolt of 1996.   38
Peru 1932-67  Autocracy    1950-55  (B) 
    (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA))  1956-61 (E) 
         1962  (A) 
        1963-67  (E) 
 1968-74  Autocracy  (Alvarado)    1968-79  (A) 
 1975-78  Autocracy  (Bermudez) 
  1979-91  Limited Democracy  1981-85 (G)  1980-89 (Pres) 
        1988-93 (G)  1990 (B) 
 1992-2000  Autocracy
48  
 2001-eos  Limited  Democracy 
 
 
Philippines  1946-71  Limited Democracy  1946-54 (G)  1958-64 (E) 
        1965-71  (B) 
  1972-85  Autocracy (Marcos)  1978 (G/T)  1972-77 (A) 
        1981 (G/T)  1978-85 (B) 
        1982-86  (G)   
  1986-eos  Limited Democracy  1989 (G)  1986-90 (Pres) 
    (Aquino, People Power Revolt)  1991-92 (G) 
       2000  (G/T) 
 
 
Poland 1945-88  Autocracy        1950-88  (B) 
 1989-eos  Limited  Democracy
49   1989-90  (M) 
          
 
Portugal 1932-68  Autocracy  (Salazar)    1950-75  (B) 
 1969-74  Autocracy  (Caetano)     
 1975-eos  Limited  Democracy
50   1976-90  (M) 
        
 
 
Qatar  1971-94  Autocracy (bin Hamad Al Thani)    1971-90 (A) 
  1995-eos  Autocracy (bin Khalifah) 
 
 
Romania 1948-64 Autocracy  (Georghiu-Dej, Stalinists)    1950-90 (B) 
 1965-89  Autocracy  (Ceausescu) 




Russia  1992-eos  Limited Democracy  1995-96 (T/G)  1950-90 (B) 
        1999-2001 (T/G)  
 
  
Rwanda 1962-72  Autocracy  (Kayibanda)    1962-72  (B) 
  1973-93  Autocracy (Habyarimana)   1991-92 (G)  1973-80 (A) 
        1981-90  (B) 
 1994-eos  Autocracy
52   1998 (G) 
       2001  (G) 
                                                 
48 Though President Fujimori was elected democratically in 1990, his suspension of the constitution, Congress and judiciary in 
1992 and resort to authoritarian measures recommends coding the first few years of his presidency apart from the autocratic rule 
from 1992 to 2000 (when he was ousted by a newly reconstituted Congress).  A caretaker government oversaw the transition 
back to democracy with elections of Alejandro Toledo in 2001. 
49 Contract parliament began the transition from Soviet authoritarianism. 
50 After coup attempts by Movimento das Forças Armadas (MFA) and failed countercoup by General Antonio de Spinola and 
revolutionaries, New Constitutional Regime held elections in 1975. 
51 Following a violent uprising during which Ceausescu was executed, the weak democracy was dominated by former members 
of the Communist party until other parties formed in the mid-1990’s. 
52 After Habyarimana’s plane was shot down in 1993, civil violence erupted in the country claiming the lives of more than 
800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus.  The Rwandan Patriotic Front formed a new government after defeating the Hutu regime.     39
 
 
Saudi Arabia 1932-eos  Autocracy  (Monarchy)    1950-90  (A) 
 
 
Senegal 1960-eos  Autocracy      1960-90  (B) 
 
 
Sierra  1961-66  Limited Democracy    1961-66 (P) 
Leone 1967  Autocracy  (Military) (Stevens)    1967-67 (A) 
  1968-91  Autocracy (All People’s Congress (APC))    1968-90 (B) 
  1992-95  Autocracy (National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC)) 
 1996  Autocracy
53 
 1997-2001  Autocracy    1998-99  (G) 
 2002-eos  Limited  Democracy 
 
 
Singapore 1965-eos  Autocracy      1965-90  (B) 
 
 
Somalia  1960-68  Limited Democracy    1960-68 (M) 
  1969-90  Autocracy     1989-92 (G)  1969-78 (A) 
    (Siyad Barre, Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC))  1979-90 (B) 




South 1961-90  Limited  Democracy
55   1980-83 (G/T)  1950-90 (B) 
Africa       1986-88  (G/T) 
 1991-eos  Limited  Democracy 
 
 
Spain 1939-74  Autocracy  (Franco)    1950-76  (A) 
  1975-eos  Limited Democracy (Constitutional Monarchy)    1977-90 (P) 
 
  
Sri Lanka  1948-eos  Limited Democracy   1971 (G/T)  1950-76 (P) 
        1989-2001 (G/T)  1977-90 (B) 
  
Sudan  1958-63  Autocracy    1963-72 (G/T)  1958-64 (A) 
  1964  Lack of State (Intifahda)   
  1965-68  Limited Democracy    1965-68 (P) 
  1969-84  Autocracy    1983-92 (G/T)  1969-84 (B) 
  1985  Lack of State
56   1985-85  (A) 
  1986-88  Limited Democracy    1986-88 (P) 
  1989-eos  Autocracy    1995-2002 (G/T)  1989-90 (A) 
       2003-eos  (G)  
 
  
Swaziland 1968-eos  Autocracy  (Monarchy)    1968-72  (B) 
        1973-77  (A) 
        1978-90  (B) 
 
 
                                                 
53 Though the officers that came to power in 1996 promised peace and civil rule, these promises were short-lived; they were 
replaced in the next year by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), prompting further fighting and the battle for 
Freetown. 
54 Coding as autocracy in the post-Barre period may be generous as conflict in Mogadishu has resulted in dissolution of any kind 
of national state while warlords have consolidated power and provided local security, laws and even governance. 
55 Despite Apartheid and the State of Emergency from 1985 to 1990, South Africa barely qualifies as an autocracy during the 
Apartheid period with a polity score of 4.  
56 The military government was overthrown by popular uprising leading to the subsequent short-lived democracy.   40
Syria 1961-65  Autocracy  (Ba’ath)    1961-69  (A) 
  1966-69  Autocracy (Salah Jadid, Ba’ath Party)     
  1970-eos  Autocracy (Hafiz al-Asad, Ba’ath Party)  1982 (G)  1970-90 (B) 
 
 
Taiwan 1949-95  Autocracy   




Tajikistan 1991-eos  Autocracy




59     1961-90 (B) 
        
 
Thailand  1958-70  Autocracy (Thanarat, Kittikachorn)    1957-68 (A) 
        1969-70  (B) 
 1971-72  Autocracy 
60   1971-74  (A) 
 1973-75  Autocracy 
61   1975  (P) 
 1976-90  Autocracy      1976  (A) 
        1977-82  (B) 
        1983-90  (P) 
 1991  Autocracy 




Togo 1960-62  Autocracy  (Olympio)    1960-66  (B) 
 1963-66  Autocracy   
 1967-eos  Autocracy  (Eyadama)    1967-78  (A) 
        1979-90  (B) 
  
Tunisia 1959-86  Autocracy  (Bourguiba)    1956-90  (B) 
 1987-eos  Autocracy  (Ali) 
 
 
Turkey 1960  Autocracy      1950-60  (B) 
  1961-70  Limited Democracy    1961-79 (P) 
 1971-72  Autocracy
63  
 1973-79  Limited  Democracy 
 1980-82  Autocracy      1980-82  (A) 
  1983-eos  Limited Democracy  1992-97 (G)  1983-90 (P) 
 
 
Turkmenistan 1991-eos  Autocracy (Niyazov) 
 
  




                                                 
57 Direct elections after the lifting of the state of emergency in 1994 eventually elected President Li through fair and free 
elections in 1996. 
58 Civil war from the period 1992 to 1997 and limited state capacity suggest that this could be coded as state failure during this 
period. 
59 Nyerere retired in 1985 paving the way for slow democratic transitions. 
60 Kittikachorn abolished constitution and parliament and seized power in 1971.   
61 Thammasak was appointed prime minister by King Phumiphon after student demonstrations and violence toppled the 
Kittikachorn military regime. 
62 Phumiphon deposed generals and called for elections leading to limited democracy. 
63 Following massive popular uprising including worker demonstrations, strikes and acts of urban terrorism, the military 
consolidated power, creating a short-lived autocratic regime.   41
Uganda  1962-65  Limited Democracy    1962-70 (B) 
 1966-70  Autocracy  (Obote) 
  1971-79  Autocracy (Amin Dada)  1979 (G)  1971-79 (A) 
  1980-85  Autocracy (Obote)  1981-88 (G)  1980-84 (Pres) 
 1985  Autocracy  (Okello)    1985-90  (A) 
 1986-eos  Autocracy  (Musoveni)  1989  (G) 
       1991  (G) 
 
 
Uruguay  1952-65  Limited Democracy (Council of Governments)    1950-72 (E) 
  1966-70  Limited Democracy (Areco) 
 1971-84  Autocracy  (Bordaberry)    1973-84  (A) 
  1985-eos  Limited Democracy    1985-90 (E) 
 
 
Uzbekistan 1990-eos  Autocracy  (Karimov) 
 
 
Vietnam 1976-eos  Autocracy  (Vietnam Communist Party) 
 
 
Yemen  1990-eos  Autocracy (Personal)  1994 (G)  1967-77 (A) 
        1978-90  (B) 
 
 
Zambia  1964-90  Autocracy (United National Independence Party (UNIP))  1964-90 (B) 
 1991-eos  Limited  Democracy 
 
 
Zimbabwe 1965-79  Autocracy      1965-90  (B) 
 1980-eos  Autocracy  (Robert  Mugabe) 
 